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Abstract
Inthispaper,weextendtheRomer[JournalofPoliticalEconomy98(Part2)(1990)S271]model
in two ways. First we include energy consumption of intermediates. Second, intermediates become
heterogeneousduetoendogenousenergy-savingtechnicalchange.Weshowthattheresultingmodel
can still generate steady state growth, but the growth rate depends negatively on the growth of real
energy prices. The reason is that real energy price rises will lower the proﬁtability of using new
intermediategoods,andhence,theproﬁtabilityofdoingresearch,andthereforehaveanegativeim-
pactongrowth.Wealsoshowthattheintroductionofanenergytaxthatisrecycledintheformofan
R&D subsidy may increase growth. We conclude that in order to have energy efﬁciency growth and
outputgrowthunderrisingrealenergyprices,acombinationofR&Dandenergypolicyiscalledfor.
© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Steady state economic growth requires a corresponding growth of energy consumption,
unless the energy efﬁciency of production grows faster than output itself.1 The last 30 years
orsohaveindeedshownasigniﬁcantgrowthoftheenergyefﬁciencyofproduction.Astrik-
ing example in this respect is Japan.2 During the period 1955–1973, Japan’s manufacturing
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31-43-388-3875.
E-mail address: adriaan.vanzon@merit.unimaas.nl (A. van Zon).
1 The energy efﬁciency of production is deﬁned as the inverse of the consumption of energy per unit of output.
2 See Watanabe (1999). See also Table 1 in Smulders and de Nooij (2001), showing that the US, France, West
Germany, and UK have succeeded in substituting technology for energy, too.
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industry enjoyed an average annual growth rate of 13.3%, which was supported by a stable
supply of cheap energy, growing at 12.9% per year (the annual increase in rate of energy
efﬁciency was only 0.4% in that period). In the Seventies, however, the world economy
experienced two big energy-price shocks, and policy makers in Japan had to take strict
measures to increase energy efﬁciency. They were very successful indeed, since Japan’s
manufacturing industry grew at 3% per year on average during the years 1974–1994, while
its energy consumption declined by 0.4% (hence, energy efﬁciency increased by 3.4%).
The key to this miracle was energy-saving technological change through the development
and production of more energy-efﬁcient products.
Although the inﬂuence of energy on growth has been a popular topic in ‘old’ growth
theory, mainly in the context of exhaustible resources,3 in ‘new’ growth theory energy con-
sumption has so far not been a serious issue, although there are some exceptions (Aghion
and Howitt, 1998; Smulders and de Nooij, 2001). Energy-economy modellers, on the other
hand, have shown a renewed interest in the relationship between energy use and technol-
ogy, mainly in the form of induced technological change (henceforth, ITC).4 Their main
research question has been whether price shocks and policy changes induce the develop-
ment of energy-saving technologies. For example, Newell et al. (1999) have empirically
tested the induced innovation hypothesis at the product level, using a dataset on consumer
durables. They did indeed ﬁnd evidence that the energy efﬁciency of these durables had in-
creasedinresponsetorisingenergypricesandgovernmentregulations,besidesautonomous
overall technological change. Popp (2001) has addressed the ITC question at the aggregate
level by relating U.S. patent data from 1970 to 1994 to changes in energy-prices. He ﬁnds
that there is a strong positive impact of energy prices on technological change. The ITC
idea has been quickly assimilated in environment-economy models.5 Not only because in-
duced innovations are a reality to be taken into account, and certainly so in the long term,
but also because induced energy-saving technical change makes for less gloomy growth
prospects from an energy consumption perspective. The reason for the latter is that if price
changes induce energy-saving technological change, then policies that raise the user price
of energy (e.g. environmental taxes and regulations) may help pollution abatement, while
the negative impacts of higher energy prices on the growth of an economy may in part be
overcomethroughinducedenergy-savingtechnologicalchange.Recentstudiesnonetheless
showed that that ‘wish’ is hard to realise. Two recent examples are Goulder and Schnei-
der (1999) and Nordhaus (2002). The numerical model of Goulder and Schneider (1999)
show that a carbon-tax may stimulate research in alternative energy industries. Such a tax
however may discourage R&D by non-energy industries and by carbon-based energy in-
dustries. The reduction in the latter industries may even slow down their output growth,
and hence, the overall growth of economy. Nordhaus (2002) compares the implications of
policy changes in two different set-ups: in the basic model increases in the price of carbon
energy relative to other inputs induce users to purchase more fuel-efﬁcient equipment or
employ less-energy-intensive products and services. In the modiﬁed model a rise in the
3 See, for example, Dasgupta and Heal (1974).
4 The formal theory of induced innovation goes back to 1960s (e.g. Nelson, 1959; Kennedy, 1962). A recent
comprehensive work on ITC-related issues is Ruttan (2001).
5 See Jaffe et al. (2002) for a review of the literature on technological change and the environment.A. van Zon, I.H. Yetkiner/Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2003) 81–103 83
price of carbon energy induces ﬁrms to develop new processes and products that are less
carbon intensive than existing products. Nordhaus (2002) concludes that substitution (of
other factors for energy) is a powerful factor that may even surpass ITC in implementing
climate-change policies. Nordhaus (2002) also stresses the main shortcoming of a purely
ITC oriented analysis: “the investments in inventive activity are too small to make a major
difference(...).R&Disabout2%ofoutputintheenergysector,whileconventionalinvest-
ment is close to 30% of output. Even with supernormal returns, the small fraction devoted
to research is unlikely to outweigh other investment” (Nordhaus, 2002, p. 284). But it is
not only R&D in the energy sector itself that will be inﬂuenced by proﬁt incentives arising
from rising real energy prices. Indeed, a macro perspective regarding the consumption of
energy as part of the macro-economic production process and its relation with R&D efforts
that are driven by economic incentives may be a far better starting point for the analysis of
the effects of incentive driven technological change in environment-economy models. And
if one is interested in the effectiveness of energy policy measures and their impact on long
term growth, then new growth theory seems to be the logical point of departure.
The preoccupation of new growth theorists with steady state growth situations actually
takes the sustainability of the steady state for granted, even though this has been a hotly
debated issue from the Seventies until now (Meadows et al., 1972 started this debate,
while Lomborg, 2001 is the latest contribution, but many others have contributed too). And
although new growth theorists have successfully addressed the problem of endogenising
growth by linking growth performance to (Schumpeterian) proﬁt incentives, they have also
continued to neglect the fact that equally endogenous energy-saving technical change will
be necessary to make these growth paths sustainable in practice. Our contribution to the
discussion on endogenous growth then lies in the incorporation of energy as an explicit
factor of production in an endogenous growth model based on Romer (1990).
There are other inﬂuential studies in endogenous growth literature than Romer (1990),
though. Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) are
the most important contributors. But we ‘borrow’ the Romer (1990) model, because it al-
lows us to use the idea of embodiment of technical change as in traditional (putty–putty)
vintage modelling. For, technical change pertaining to the energy efﬁciency of production
must largely be embodied in new machinery and equipment. This implies that the rate of
investment in physical capital is instrumental in realising the potential energy efﬁciency
improvements based on the accumulation of new knowledge: the macro-economic budget
constraint is not only constraining the accumulation of capital in volume terms, but also
the rate at which the energy efﬁciency of production at the aggregate level changes. In the
contextoftheRomer(1990)model,thisimpliesthatwewillallowﬁrmstouseintermediate
factors of production that incorporate the latest technological developments with respect
to the energy consumption characteristics of these intermediates. By doing so, we break
the symmetry between intermediates present in Romer’s original model.6 Because of this
6 Through the intrinsic productivity differences between intermediates, we acknowledge the empirical obser-
vation that productivity growth and investment in equipment and machinery are positively correlated (see e.g.
Gregory and James, 1973; Hulten, 1992). In all fairness, it should also be admitted that a vintage formulation
primarily leads to different paths of transition between steady states, instead of different steady states. Since we
will be focusing on the steady state rather than transitions, the vintage interpretation proposed here serves mainly
the purpose of theoretical ‘correctness’.84 A. van Zon, I.H. Yetkiner/Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2003) 81–103
symmetry, technical change in the original Romer model merely increases the number of
all intermediate goods used in producing output. But by doing so, technical change also
provides opportunities for the division of production tasks between intermediates, thus,
raising the productivity of all factors as a whole. This idea is comparable to the notion of
Smithsonian labour division. In Romer (1990), therefore, technical change is of an organi-
sational nature, ‘embodied’ in the whole rather than in individual machines/intermediates,
and it takes the form of horizontal product differentiation.7
The Aghion and Howitt (1992) model, by contrast, starts from the assumption that tech-
nicalchangeiscompletelyembodiedinnewequipmentthatusesonlythelatesttechnology.
Alreadyexistingtechnologiesaredrivenoutofthemarketbythearrivalofsuperiortechnolo-
gies. This is the so-called creative destruction effect ﬁrst labelled as such by Schumpeter.
One of the most interesting features of the Aghion and Howitt model is that the current rate
of technological progress is negatively inﬂuenced by an increase in the expected future rate
oftechnologicalchangebecauseoftheproﬁterosiononexistingtechnologiescausedbythe
entry of superior technologies in the future. Their model may be regarded as an improve-
ment over the Romer model at least with respect to the asymmetries between intermediates.
However, their model is frequently used to explain vertical (quality) product differentiation
as it allows for just one technology to be used at a certain point in time in some sector of
industry. The latter feature makes this model less suitable for our purposes.
Our model then takes up an intermediate position between the Romer (1990) model and
the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model. For as in Romer (1990) we have inﬁnitely many
technologies being used at the same time, while we also allow for qualitative differences
between individual intermediate goods, as in the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model. In our
model,therefore,productivitygrowthattheaggregatelevelistheresultofbothloveofvari-
ety and quality improvements. Further details of our model are as follows. A representative
ﬁrm in the ﬁnal-goods sector produces output by using human capital and a continuum
of varieties, in the way deﬁned by Ethier (1982). Each intermediate good in turn is pro-
duced by a monopolist. The operation of an intermediate good requires the services of raw
capital and energy in proportions described by a Cobb–Douglas technology. Hence, we
allow for substitution between energy and capital, although we should state here that the
Cobb–Douglas form may overestimate substitution possibilities as they exist in practice.8
However, we stick to the Cobb–Douglas speciﬁcation because it perfectly ﬁts the purpose
of building a model that is able to generate balanced growth.
We capture the rise in the productivity of new intermediates by incorporating a Hicks-
neutral technology component in the Cobb–Douglas function. That component is different
foreachintermediate:thelatestintermediatesarethemostproductive,asinordinaryvintage
modelling. The fact that the aggregator function is Cobb–Douglas allows us to interpret the
growth in this technology component as energy-saving technical change, capital-saving
technical change, or a combination of these two. We focus on technology and growth, and
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quantity at real energy prices that are growing at a given rate.9 The intrinsic productivity
differencesbetweenintermediatesprovideacombinationofahorizontalandverticalproduct
differentiation setting, leading to a gradual and relative obsolescence of older intermediates
as technology advances. Hence, our model gives rise to ‘creative wear and tear’ instead of
thecompleteandtotal‘creativedestruction’inAghionandHowitt(1992),sinceallvarieties
willliveforeveralthoughtheyfadeawayintime.AnR&Dsectorthatcreatestheknowledge
necessary to build a new (more productive) intermediate good completes the supply side of
themodel.Thisknowledgeissummarisedintheformofablueprint.Becauseintermediates




The model enables us to look into the growth implications of rising energy prices and to
analysethegrowtheffectsofenergypolicyinthisrespect.Increasesinrealenergypricesare
likely to occur during the transition that lies ahead of us towards an economy that operates
in a relatively ‘renewable fuel intensive’ way.
Thepaperhastwoimportantﬁndings.First,itshowsthataggregateenergyefﬁciencymay
be improved through stepping up basic research. Secondly, increasing real energy prices
lead to corresponding rises in the user costs of intermediates, and hence, to a fall in proﬁts
on those intermediates. This diminishes the incentive to produce newer, more productive
intermediates. However, it should be noted that the decrease in this incentive is cushioned
to some extent by the ‘ample’ substitution possibilities between raw capital and energy im-
plied by the Cobb–Douglas function.10 If actual substitution possibilities between capital
andenergyarelower,thentheriseintheusercostsofintermediateswouldbehigher,ceteris
paribus, and the detrimental effects on research incentives would of course be stronger than
our model suggests. Nonetheless, the model is clear about what to expect if the growth rate
of real energy prices rises. There will be less growth, unless policy measures are taken that
counteract the negative effects on research incentives arising from a positive growth rate of
real energy prices.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we explain how we have modiﬁed the
Romer(1990)model.InSection3,weshowwhatcontinuouslyrisingrealenergypricesmay
mean for growth, and how an energy tax (possibly recycled in the form of a subsidy on re-
searchcosts)mayaffectgrowth.Finally,weprovidesomeconcludingremarksinSection4.
2. The modiﬁed Romer model
The Romer model is a three-sector macro-economic model containing a ﬁnal output
sector,anintermediategoodsproducingsector,andanR&Dsector.11 Theﬁnaloutputsector
9 The reason for this is that we want to focus on the growth and technology implications of energy price rises,
and we want to keep our analysis as simple as possible.
10 Nordhaus (2002) underlines the importance of substituting capital (and labour) for energy in comparison to
induced energy saving technical change.
11 We simplify the original Romer model somewhat by distinguishing only high skilled labour. For more math-
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produces output that can be used for private consumption purposes and investment. The
intermediate goods sector uses (raw) capital to build intermediate goods that produce ﬁnal
output in combination with labour. The R&D sector creates the blueprints for new varieties
of intermediate goods. These blueprints are sold to the intermediate goods sector. The latter
sector uses these blueprints to build new varieties of intermediates. The productive services
provided by these intermediates are then sold under imperfectly competitive conditions to
the ﬁnal output sector. The proﬁts arising from selling intermediate goods services are the
incentive for designing these intermediates. It is assumed that the R&D sector succeeds in
appropriating all the proﬁts that the suppliers of intermediate goods obtain, by setting the
prices of their blueprints equal to the expected present value of the proﬁt streams associated
with the current and future use of these intermediates.
In the Romer model, but also in our model, the trade-off between present and future con-
sumption is governed by the accumulation of physical capital and productive knowledge,
but also by the allocation of human capital over its competing uses. Faster accumulation
of physical and productive knowledge implies lower current levels of consumption, since
investment needs to be increased at the expense of consumption and more time needs to be
spent on accumulating knowledge. Future consumption can be higher when the new invest-
ment goods come on line and that new knowledge becomes productive. Moreover, a larger




of physical capital and the allocation of human capital between knowledge generation and




now and in the future results in endogenous growth that is inﬂuenced by changes in real
energy prices.
2.1. The ﬁnal output sector
As in Romer (1990), we use an Ethier production function (see Ethier, 1982) for ﬁnal







i )α di (1)
whereLy islabourinputusedinﬁnal-outputproduction.xe
i aretheeffectivecapitalservices
obtained from using the ith type of intermediate good, 1 − α is the partial output elasticity
of labour, and A denotes the number of blueprints invented up to the present time.12
It should be noted that Eq. (1) can be re-interpreted as a two-level production function
with output Y as a Cobb–Douglas function of labour Ly and effective capital Ke at the upper
12 Because we use continuous time analysis, A is a real number rather than an integer.A. van Zon, I.H. Yetkiner/Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2003) 81–103 87
level, while effective capital Ke is a CES aggregate of the individual capital services of all








it follows immediately that Eq. (1) can be rewritten as
Y = L1−α
Y (Ke)α (3)
Eq. (3) is the Cobb–Douglas production function mentioned above. It follows from Eq. (2)
that intermediate effective capital services are imperfect substitutes with elasticity of sub-
stitution equal to (1/(1 − α)) > 1, since 0 <α<1. The individual intermediates are
therefore better substitutes for each other than labour and aggregate effective capital are,
since the Cobb–Douglas production function implies an elasticity of substitution between
labour and aggregate effective capital equal to one.
The level of demand for each intermediate follows from the ﬁrst order conditions for a
proﬁt maximum of the ﬁnal output sector, which provide the inverse demand functions for
the various inputs. We can obtain these inverse demand functions as follows. Let proﬁts ΠY
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where wy is the wage-rate in the ﬁnal-goods sector, pe
i is the rental price of the effective
services of the ith intermediate good,13 and the price of ﬁnal output is normalised to one.
Then, in a situation of perfect competition on the ﬁnal output market and the factor input






i )α−1 − pe
i = 0 (5)
∂ΠY
∂LY
= (1 − α)
Y
LY
− wY = 0 (6)
Eq.(5)providestheinversedemandfunctionfortheﬁrmthatproducestheithintermediate,
whereas Eq. (6) describes the requirement that the real wage rate must equal the marginal
product of labour. Eq. (5) implies a price elasticity of the demand for effective capital
services equal to ε =− 1/(1 − α).
2.2. The intermediate goods sector
We assume that effective capital services xe
i supplied by the ith intermediate are a
Cobb–Douglas aggregate of raw capital xi and energy ei:
xe
i = λi(xi)β(ei)1−β (7)
13 We follow this set-up of the rental of intermediates to stick as closely as possible to the Romer (1990) model.
The rental price of intermediates includes the marginal cost of the production of effective services (consisting of
energy and capital costs, see Eq. (9)), and a proﬁt mark-up over these marginal costs (see Eq. (10)).88 A. van Zon, I.H. Yetkiner/Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2003) 81–103
where β measures the partial elasticity of effective capital services with respect to raw
capital services, and 1 − β is the partial elasticity of effective capital services with respect
toenergy.λi isthe‘total-factor’productivityofrawcapitalandenergy,andittakestheform
ofHicks-neutraltechnicalchange(i.e.thetypeoftechnicalchangethataugmentsallfactors
in the same way) in the production of effective capital services.14 Before discussing its full
properties, let us note that λi depends on the latest technology at the time the variety under
consideration was designed. Hence, λi changes over time. If we denote the proportional
growth rate of λi by ˆ λi (where from now on a hat over a variable denotes its proportional
instantaneousrateofgrowth),then ˆ λi canalsobeinterpretedas‘energyaugmenting/saving’
technical change at rate ˆ λi/(1 − β).
Animportantfeatureofourmodelisthatitdoesnotallowforproductivityimprovements
of intermediates after their invention.15 This implies that λi can only change over time for
i = A, i.e. for the latest intermediate. The question is now what λi as a function of the
blueprint-index i should look like. Since we want our model to be able to generate steady
state growth like the Romer model does (even with continuously rising real energy prices),
the answer to this question can be obtained as follows. Because Eq. (7) is a Cobb–Douglas
function, we know that a cost minimising raw capital/energy ratio is inversely proportional
to the ratio of the (rental) price ratio of raw capital and energy, i.e. ei/xi = (1−β)r/(βq),
where r is the real rate of interest and q is the real price of energy. Since Eq. (7) can be
written as xe
i /xi = λi(ei/xi)1−β, it follows immediately that the growth rate of effective
capital services associated with intermediate i is given by ˆ xe
i =ˆ xi + ˆ λi + (1 − β)(ˆ r −ˆ q).
It should furthermore be noted that for constant values of the growth rates ˆ xi, ˆ λi, ˆ r and ˆ q,
the growth rate ˆ xe
i is also constant. It can be shown that in that case, the effective capital
stock will grow at a constant rate, just like output.16 Since ˆ λi = 0 for i<Aby assumption,
steady state growth therefore requires ˆ λA = (dlog(λA)/dlog(A)) ˆ A = ς ˆ A to be constant.





dlog(A) ⇔ λA = λ0Aς (8)
with ς ≥ 0, and λ0 is the ‘total-factor productivity’ of the ﬁrst intermediate. Eq. (8) states
that equal proportional expansions of the number of intermediates will be associated with
equal proportional increases in the total-factor productivity of the latest intermediate. The
corresponding factor of proportion is ς, which measures, therefore, implicitly the quality
improvements of the latest intermediates.
14 Note that by setting β = 1 and ˆ λi = 0, we obtain the original Romer model.
15 Although this assumption simpliﬁes the analysis enormously, it neglects the fact that productivity growth may
also result from process R&D and learning-by-doing. However, van Zon (2001) shows, albeit in a somewhat
different context where product and process R&D are interlinked, that net R&D reactions to changes in proﬁt
incentives are qualitatively the same as in this model without ex post productivity improvements due to process
R&D.
16 This follows from the constancy of the growth rate of A in combination with Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) from
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2.3. Aggregate capital- and energy-demand and growth
Given the functional form chosen for λi, we can now calculate how the effective capital
stock is composed in terms of individual intermediates, for given technology and given
real energy prices. We do this by straightforward aggregation over all intermediates. Given
these aggregates, we can then calculate the steady state growth rate of our economy using
Eq. (1). In order to do this, we must ﬁrst determine the demand for raw capital services and
energy by the intermediate goods sector, since that is the only sector that uses these inputs
directly.Weassumethatfactordemandattheintermediatelevelisgovernedbytheprinciple
of proﬁt maximisation at given factor prices. It should be noted that proﬁt maximisation
implies cost-minimisation, and we can therefore use Shephard’s lemma to derive the cost
minimising factor inputs. In order to do that, we need the unit minimum cost function of











where ci is the unit minimum cost of producing the effective capital services associated
with intermediate i.17 Eq. (9) states that unit costs of producing a unit of effective capital
services fall with the blueprint-index i, since unit costs depend negatively on ‘total-factor
productivity’ λi. The total cost of producing effective capital services associated with inter-
mediate i is simply the product cixe
i . Because of perfect competition on the factor markets
andthelinearhomogeneityofEq.(9),itfollowsthatforanindividualproducerofintermedi-
ate goods, ci is also the marginal cost of producing xe
i . Consequently, the proﬁt maximising
rental price of an effective unit of capital for the ﬁnal goods producing sector, i.e. pe
i,i s
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17 The unit minimum cost function ci is readily derived from a standard cost minimisation problem with a
Cobb–Douglas production function and given factor prices, as it is the case here.
18 The Amoroso–Robinson condition states that in case of proﬁt maximisation, marginal beneﬁts should match
marginal costs. In that case we have d(px)/dx = p(1+(1/ε)) = dc/dx, where ε is the price elasticity of demand,
xis demand and pthe corresponding price, and dc/dxis marginal cost. Note from Eq. (5) that for each intermediate
good the price elasticity of demand is equal to ε =− 1/(1 − α). Eq. (10) then follows immediately from Eq. (9).
19 Shephard’s lemma implies that the cost minimising input-factor coefﬁcient (i.e. the inverse of factor produc-
tivity), can be obtained by partial differentiation of the unit-minimum cost function with respect to the price of the
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After substitution of Eqs. (11) and (12) into the deﬁnitions of aggregate physical capital
(i.e. K =
 A
0 xi di), aggregate effective capital Ke (see Eq. (2)), and total energy demand
(i.e. E =
 A



















Eq. (13) can be used to link the growth rate of output to that of real energy prices. For,
assuming, as Romer does, that the real rate of interest21 and LY are constant in the steady
state, and assuming that the growth rate of real energy prices is constant too, it follows from
Eqs. (1) and (13) that the steady state growth rate of output is given by22
ˆ Y=(1 − α)ˆ LY + α ˆ Ke=α ˆ Ke= ˆ K⇒ ˆ Y =





ˆ q = ˆ K (15)
Eq. (15) shows that with constant real energy prices (i.e. ˆ q = 0), the steady state growth
rate will exceed the growth rate of the number of blueprints if ς ≥ 0. This is due to the fact
that growth does not only come from an increase in the number of intermediates (i.e. ‘love
ofvariety’asinRomer),butalsofromtheintrinsicproductivityimprovementsembodiedin
the latest intermediates.23 However, with continuous rises in real energy prices (ˆ q>0), a
moreintensiveuseofrawcapitalasasubstituteforenergyiscalledfor.Moreover,thehigher
the effective capital elasticity of energy (i.e. 1 − β) is, the stronger will be the decrease in
the growth rate of output for a given growth rate of real energy prices.24
2.4. The R&D sector
TheR&DsectoruseslabourLA toproduceblueprintsnexttotheexperienceaccumulated
during the production of all previous blueprints. That experience is proxied by the total
number of blueprints A itself. As in Romer, we have
dA
dt
= δALA ⇒ ˆ A = δ(L− LY) (16)
where δ represents the productivity of the R&D process, while LA = L−LY is the amount
of R&D labour and L is the total labour force. The proceeds from selling blueprints are
20 For the technical details, see Appendix A.
21 See Appendix B for a more extensive discussion of this assumption.
22 In Eq. (15), the equality ˆ Y = ˆ K comes from the assumption that the real rate of interest, i.e. the marginal
product of physical capital, is constant. It is beyond the scope of this paper to prove rigorously that the real interest
rate is indeed constant in the steady state, but an intuition that this is the case is developed in Appendix B to this
paper.
23 The latter depend directly on the value of ς (see Eq. (8)). If ς = 0, as in the original Romer model, there are
no quality improvements, hence, the growth of output in the absence of real energy price rises is exactly what
Romer ﬁnds.
24 A high value of 1 − β implies that the marginal costs of effective capital consist largely of energy costs.A. van Zon, I.H. Yetkiner/Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2003) 81–103 91
paidaswagestoR&Dworkers.Theinstantaneousﬂowofproceedsisgivenby(dA/dt)VA,
where dA/dt is the number of new blueprints produced during the inﬁnitesimally small
time period dt (i.e. ‘the present’), and where VA is the real value of such a blueprint. Since
Πi = (1 − α)pe
ixe
i , we can use Eqs. (5) and (10) to obtain
Πi = (1 − α)pe
ixe
i = (1 − α)α(1+α)/(1−α)c
−α/(1−α)
i LY (17)
Eq. (17) can be used in combination with the zero-proﬁt condition in the R&D sector
to obtain the R&D wage rate in function of the proﬁt ﬂows associated with the latest
intermediate. Labour market arbitrage then ensures that the marginal beneﬁts from do-
ing R&D should match the marginal beneﬁts from employment in the ﬁnal output sector,







r − ˆ ΠA
⇔ wA = δA
ΠA
r − ˆ ΠA
(18)
In Eq. (18), wA is the real wage rate earned by R&D labour, while VA is the expected
present value of the proﬁt stream associated with using intermediate with index A. ΠA is
obtained from Eq. (17) for i = A. Note that for constant r and ˆ ΠA in the steady state,
we would have VA = ΠA/(r − ˆ ΠA), where proﬁt ﬂows for all intermediates are given
by Eq. (17), and where ˆ ΠA is the expected rate of growth of proﬁt ﬂows for the current
latest intermediate after the moment it is ﬁrst used, i.e. the rate of growth of ex post proﬁt
ﬂows.25 In Appendix C, we show that the rate of growth of ex post proﬁts on intermediate
i is given by ˆ Πi =− (a(1 − β)/(1 − α))ˆ q, also for i = A. It is this rate that should be
inserted in Eq. (18) for i = A in order to be able to determine the equilibrium allocation of
labour.
2.5. Labour market equilibrium
Labour market arbitrage ensures that wY = wA, where the wage rate of R&D labour
is given by Eq. (18). Substitution of Eqs. (18) and (6) after substituting Eq. (1) as well as









will change the allocation of labour in favour of ﬁnal output generation. This also happens
if the real interest rate rises, which calls for less roundabout ways of producing output,
i.e. less knowledge intensive production. Moreover, if ς rises, z will increase too, LY will
decrease and LA will therefore increase as well. A rise in the rate of embodied technical
change therefore also increases the arrival rate (dA/dt) of new intermediates.
25 ˆ ΠA doesthereforenotrefertotheincreaseovertimeofinitialproﬁtﬂowsofthelatestvintage,seeAppendixC
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2.6. Steady state results
Eq. (19) can be substituted into Eq. (16), the result of which in turn can be substituted
into Eq. (15), giving us the steady state growth rate that the system is able to generate, for
given values of r and ˆ q:









Eq. (20) summarises the reactions of the various sectors making up the supply side of
the economy. It deﬁnes a negatively sloped relation between growth and the real interest
rate. The demand-side is represented by a standard constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitutionutilityfunctionasinRomer(1990).Thisresultsinthefollowingupwardsloping
relation between output growth and the interest rate:




where σ = 1/θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ρ is the rate of pure time
preference, and C is private consumption, and where we have assumed that the labour force
L is constant over time.26
The equilibrium steady state growth rate can now be obtained by eliminating the real
































δ(1 − α)z(α + θ)
(δz(1 − α)θL+ ρ(1 − α)+ˆ qα(1 − β)(1 − θ)) (24)
Eq. (24) shows that in a balanced growth situation the amount of labour allocated to the
ﬁnal output sector increases with the rate of discount (future consumption possibilities are
valued less, hence, the greater emphasis on current consumption through an increase in
ﬁnaloutput).Moreover,anincreaseinδ wouldlowertheamountoflabourallocatedtoﬁnal
output production, while an increase in θ has ambiguous effects. Note too that an increase
in ς (through a corresponding increase in z) favours growth: LY goes down and growth
goes up (see Eqs. (24) and (22)). Finally, it should be noted that Eqs. (22)–(24) reproduce
Romer’s growth results for z = 1 and ˆ q = 0.
26 In that case the growth of consumption per head is equal to the growth of consumption. Eq. (21) is then
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Fig. 1. Steady state equilibrium.
2.7. A graphical representation of the model
The main equations of the model are graphically represented in Fig. 1, which will also be
ofhelplaterinevaluatingchangesinsteadystategrowthresultsarisingfrompolicychanges.
By connecting each point of the relation LY(r) in quadrant IV to a corresponding point in
quadrant I, passing through quadrants III and II, we can show how a shift in LY(r) leads to a
change in the equilibrium steady state growth rate. This ‘connecting procedure’ mimics the
fact that Eq. (20) can be obtained by substituting Eq. (19) into Eq. (16) and the result thus
obtained into Eq. (15). Since all the relations used in Fig. 1 are linear in all the variables
concerned, it follows that the vertical intercept of Eq. (19) can be obtained by setting r = 0
and then following the connecting procedure starting from the LY,r-plane going clockwise.
The horizontal intercept of Eq. (19) is obtained by setting ˆ Y = 0 in the ˆ Y, ˆ A-plane and
thengoinganti-clockwise.Becauseofthelinearityofthesystem,theverticalandhorizontal
interceptstakentogetherdeﬁne(thegraphof)Eq.(19).Itisnoweasytoseethatadownward
shift in LY(r) in quadrant IV as depicted in Fig. 1 due to, for instance, an increase in ˆ q, leads
to a steady state with lower growth, as indicated by the curved arrow in quadrant I.27
Themodeljustdescribedshowsthateconomicgrowthisfavouredbytechnicalchangethat
improves the productivity of raw capital and/or energy in generating effective capital. For,
in that case, the downward sloping line in quadrant I would shift upwards, thus, increasing
both the equilibrium growth rate and the real rate of interest. The line in quadrant IV would
also shift towards the origin and would become more horizontal, while the line in quadrant
IIIwouldbecomemorevertical.These‘deformations’ofthevariouscurvesineachquadrant
27 Note that such an increase in ˆ q would actually also shift the curve in quadrant II somewhat to the left, but this
only reinforces our conclusion regarding the change in the equilibrium combination of growth and the real interest
rate, so we have not drawn this shift in quadrant II in order to keep the Figure easier to read.94 A. van Zon, I.H. Yetkiner/Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2003) 81–103




prices. Moreover, the equilibrium real interest rate would be lower as well. We conclude
that in our set-up continuously rising real energy prices have a negative effect on economic
growth,butthiseffectwouldbemoreoutspokenifitwerenotcounteractedtosomeextentby
changesintheproductivityofthefactorsthatgenerateeffectivecapitalservices.28 However,
it seems probable that the Cobb–Douglas speciﬁcation we have chosen for that generator
functionover-estimateslongrunsubstitutionpossibilitiesbetweenrawcapitalandenergyas
they exist in practice. Because of that, it is also likely to under-estimate the negative growth
effects of rising real energy prices. Holding this in mind, we will now turn to the effects of
introducing an energy tax with and without recycling in the form of an R&D subsidy.
3. Policy implications
The model we have described contains several market failures. The ﬁrst one is the
intertemporal spill-over of current R&D efforts that improves the productivity of all fu-
ture activities, and that is not accounted for in the ‘price’ of the latest blueprint. This leads
to R&D activity that is too low from a societal point of view (cf. Romer, 1990; Aghion and
Howitt, 1992, 1998). The second is the market imperfection regarding the supply of inter-
mediates. This imperfection leads to too low a level of demand for these intermediates, and
therefore, to a correspondingly low level of output (but a level that is at least growing over
time). However, in an endogenous growth model it is exactly this kind of imperfection that
provides the motivation for people to do research in the ﬁrst place. Nonetheless, the growth
of welfare is affected by these market failures. Romer (1990) shows that a central planner
wouldchooseagrowthratethatishigherthantheoneselectedbyprivateindividualsbyallo-
catingmorelabourtoresearch.SinceourmodelisanextensionoftheRomer(1990)model,
we would like to investigate the possibility of counteracting this ‘growth-deﬁcit’ through
policy actions that cure the under-allocation of labour to research activities. In addition to
curing the effects of market failures, such policy actions would also be needed to mitigate
the drop in growth following a rise in the rate of growth of real energy prices, as one could
expect it to happen during the transition towards a non-carbon based fuel economy that lies
ahead of us. Furthermore, we want to ﬁnd out whether it would be possible to have a posi-
tive ‘growth-dividend’ at all, i.e. have higher output growth and lower energy consumption
growth,giventhenegativegrowtheffectsthatcanbeexpectedfromrisingrealenergyprices.
The latter policy problem is depicted in Fig. 2. In that ﬁgure, the solid negatively sloped
line in the ˆ A, ˆ q-plane is obtained by substituting Eq. (24) into Eq. (16). The relation under
consideration is given by







α(1 − β)(1 − θ)
(α + θ)(1 − α)z
(25)
28 This follows immediately from the fact that the equilibrium growth rate given by Eq. (22) has an intercept that
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Fig. 2. The ‘sustainable growth cone’.
The ray from the origin labelled II, corresponds with the requirement of non-negative
output growth, i.e. ˆ Y ≥ 0 (see Eq. (15) after substituting z = (1 − α + ςα)/(1 − α) and
t = α(1−β)/(1−α). Non-positive growth of energy consumption requires, in accordance
with Eqs. (14) and (15), that ˆ E = ˆ K −ˆ q = ˆ Y −ˆ q = z ˆ A − (t + 1)ˆ q ≤ 0. So, in order
to have positive output growth and negative energy growth, only combinations of ˆ A and ˆ q
within the cone bounded by the two rays labelled I and II are feasible.
Withoutanypolicyinterference,abalancedgrowthcombinationof ˆ Aand ˆ q thatisfeasible
also in the long run should be somewhere in this cone and on the negatively sloped line
through point A. But parameter constellations may be such that that might not be the case.
For, in the region below ray II, the growth of the number of varieties ˆ A is always too low to
beabletohavebothpositiveoutputgrowthandnegativeenergyconsumptiongrowth.Inthe
region above ray I, ˆ A pushes up output and capital growth such that the growth in energy
consumption is also positive. Hence, for a given value of the growth rate of real energy
prices given by ˆ q =¯ q in Fig. 2, the only way to get balanced and sustainable growth is to
try to push Eq. (25) outwards (as depicted by the dotted line parallel to Eq. (25) through
point B in Fig. 2, so that a move from point A to a point within the cone, like point B,
becomespossible.Theonlypossibleoptionsthatleadtounambiguousresultsseemtobean
increase in either ς (hence, z)29 or δ through science and technology policy, or a decrease
in ρ or θ, i.e. making people care more about the future.
The policies that we want to investigate more closely now are the introduction of an
energy tax, with and without recycling in the form of an R&D subsidy to the same amount.
We leave the other policy suggestions for what they are, since we have not speciﬁed an
endogenous link between policy instruments and the corresponding parameters. However,
29 In that case, the intercept does not only increase, but the line would also become more horizontal. The latter
reinforces the effects of the increase in the vertical intercept. Note too that in case z increases, the rays from the
origin would shift in a downward direction, so that sustainable growth becomes feasible for lower values of ˆ A for
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the effects of an energy tax with recycling should be comparable to some extent to those
associatedwithachangeinδ suchthatEq.(25)shiftsoutwardsinFig.2.Oneshouldrealise
that the introduction of a tax will change the marginal cost of the provision of effective
capital services, and hence, the proﬁtability of producing intermediates, as we have shown
in Section 2. Changes in proﬁtability will inﬂuence the allocation of labour over its two
uses: R&D and ﬁnal output generation. This will change the steady state growth rate, apart
from having level effects as well.30
3.1. Equilibrium growth effects of an energy tax without R&D recycling
The effects of an introduction of an ad valorem energy tax with rate τ without recy-
cling are easily obtained through its implications for the labour market arbitrage condition.
We calculate these by replacing the price of energy q by (1 + τ)q in the marginal cost of
effective capital services as given by Eq. (9). Since these determine initial proﬁt ﬂows, the
wage rate in the R&D sector will be directly affected (see Eq. (18)). Eqs. (22) and (24)
therefore have the following counterparts:
ˆ Y =
α(δzL − (ρ/α)(1 + τ)a(1−β) −ˆ q(1 − β)((1 + τ)α(1−β) + α)/(1 − α))
α + θ(1 + τ)α(1−β) (26)
LY =
δz(1 − α)θL+ ρ(1 − α)+ˆ qα(1 − β)(1 − θ)
δz(1 − α)(α(1 + τ)α(β−1) + θ)
(27)
Eq. (26) shows that growth will be negatively affected by the introduction of an energy tax,
since the numerator decreases and the denominator increases with τ. From Eq. (27),w e
see that the denominator decreases with τ, thus, leading to a reallocation of labour from
research and development towards ﬁnal output. This is consistent with lower growth. It
should be noted that the impact of an energy tax on growth is larger, the higher are α and
(1 − β). This follows from the fact that energy shocks are translated into corresponding
output shocks through the channels of energy/raw capital substitution at the intermediate
level, and labour/effective capital substitution at the aggregate level, while the contribution
of energy to effective capital is implicitly measured by (1−β), and that of effective capital
to output is implicitly measured by α.
3.2. Equilibrium growth effects of an energy tax with R&D recycling
In the case of R&D recycling, the labour market arbitrage condition can be rewritten as
follows.SincealltaxproceedsarerecycledassubsidiestoR&Dworkers,wageearningsper
worker (including subsidies) in the R&D sector (i.e. w) are equal to w = wA+τqE/LA.I n
this expression, wA are the wage costs that employers in the R&D sector will have to bear.
30 These level-effects can be inferred from what happens to the equilibrium real interest rate and the allocation of
labour among research and ﬁnal output generation. A fall in the real rate of interest for instance, coincides with a
highercapitalintensityofproduction,ceterisparibus,whileahigheremploymentofresearchlabouralsoincreases
themarginalproductoflabourintheﬁnaloutputsector,henceincreasesthe(common)wage-level,ceterisparibus.A. van Zon, I.H. Yetkiner/Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2003) 81–103 97
It is easily seen that the requirement that labour earns the same wage in all occupations then







The reason why we use Eq. (28) instead of wY = w = wA + τqE/LA will become
more clear below. Note that the other structural equations of the ‘growth supply-side’ (i.e.
Eqs. (15) and (16) in Fig. 1) remain unchanged.
Unfortunately, the effects of the introduction of an energy tax plus recycling are not easy
to trace analytically, but we can develop an intuition as follows. The LHS of Eq. (28) can
be obtained by substituting Eqs. (6) and (18), after solving initial proﬁts ΠA in terms of xe
A
by means of Eq. (5). Then Eq. (A.2) from Appendix A in combination with Eq. (1) can be










Similarly, the RHS of Eq. (28) is obtained by substituting Eq. (14) for E. Then K can
be rewritten in terms of xA by means of Eq. (A.4) from Appendix A. In addition to this,
substitution of Eq. (10) into Eq. (11) enables us to write xA as a function of initial proﬁts
and r. By substituting Eq. (18) for wA, we obtain
RHS = 1 +





The question now is how the relation LY(r) that is implied by the equality between LHS
and RHS changes with τ, i.e. how a change in τ would shift LY(r)i nt h eLY, r-plane (cf.
Fig. 1). This shift enables us to derive the effects of the introduction of an energy tax with
R&D recycling on the equilibrium steady state growth rate as follows. If the introduction
of an energy tax with recycling lowers LY for a given value of r (and ˆ q), this results in
an upward shift of the supply-side relation between ˆ Y and r in the ( ˆ Y, r) plane. Since the
‘growth demand-side’ in Fig. 1 given by Eq. (21) remains unchanged, this implies a rise in
equilibrium steady state growth rate, that depends solely on the labour allocation effects of
the introduction of an energy tax accompanied by an R&D subsidy.
By means of implicit differentiation of Eq. (28), we obtain the derivative of LY with







LY(L − LY)α(1 − β)(−(L − LY)(1 − α)(1 + τ)α + LYα(1 + τ)1+αβ)
−((L − LY)2(1 − α)(1 + τ)α + L2
Yα2(1 − β)τ(1 + τ)1+αβ)
(31)
Because the denominator of Eq. (31) is negative, the derivative of LY with respect to τ
is negative if the numerator is positive. But the latter requires the ratio of R&D workers
to ﬁnal output workers to be smaller than (α(1 + τ)1−a(1−β))/(1 − α).F o rτ ≈ 0 and
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the introduction of an energy tax with recycling will raise the growth rate of output, while
the energy/capital ratio will continue to decrease. The reason why such an energy tax with
R&D recycling would not work for a high share of R&D employment in total employment
is that in that case, the marginal product of labour in ﬁnal output is high. Therefore, a
further reduction in ﬁnal output labour due to a reallocation towards the R&D sector would
decreasecurrentoutputbysomuchthatitwillnotbepossibletosubstitutecapitalforenergy
(induced by the tax) and generate net growth at the same time.
There is an important conclusion to be drawn from the policy analysis above: the
introduction of an energy tax in the context of the revised Romer model is not enough
by itself to spur R&D efforts. Rather, these are negatively affected, because either real
energy price changes or the introduction of a tax lowers the present value of a blueprint,
which in turn reduces the value marginal product of research labour. In that case, we would
expect a decrease in the allocation of labour to R&D.31 However, the subsidy on wage
cost in the R&D sector can actually more than compensate the fall in the value marginal
productofR&Dlabourthroughthefallinproﬁtﬂows,sothatinthiscase,wecouldobserve
faster growth than before the tax. Nonetheless, the model is clear about what happens to
R&D: an increase in the user price of effective capital will not induce energy-saving tech-
nical change, as one would expect that to happen at ﬁrst sight. While new (already known)
energy technologies that aren’t economically feasible at low prices of carbon-based fuels
might be adopted at sufﬁciently high fuel prices, this does not imply that (basic) research
will necessarily be stepped up at these higher prices. In reality, however, one might expect
a spur in applied research regarding newly adopted energy technologies that have become
proﬁtableathigherenergyprices.Butforreasonsofsimplicity,wedidn’tcoverendogenous
ex post productivity improvements in technologies in this paper.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented a model that is an extension of the Romer (1990) model.
We have introduced endogenous energy-saving technical change into that model by assum-
ing that technological change does not only add new intermediates, but, simultaneously,
leadstointrinsicproductivitydifferencesbetweenintermediates(duetoembodiedtechnical
change). We have also assumed that the effective capital services provided by intermedi-
ate goods require the consumption of energy. We show that the growth rate now depends
positively on the rate of embodied technical change, and that it is higher than the original
growth rate in the Romer (1990) model. However, the rate of growth of the system now also
depends negatively on the rate of growth of real energy prices, implying that continuously
rising real energy prices will tend to slow-down growth.
There are two reasons for the negative impact of rising energy prices on growth and
technological change. First, growing real energy prices decrease the proﬁtability of using
new intermediate goods, and hence, the proﬁtability of doing research. Declining proﬁt
opportunities imply lower wages in the R&D sector, which bring on a labour ﬂow from the
31 Cf.Eq.(17)whereproﬁtﬂowswouldbenegativelyinﬂuencedbytheintroductionofanenergytaxifwewould
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R&D sector to the ﬁnal good sector. The ensuing fall in wages in the ﬁnal output sector
induces ﬁnal output producers to substitute labour for effective capital. Consequently, this
internal balancing mechanism lowers the rate of growth of R&D and output. Second, the
modelallowsforsubstitutionbetweenrawcapitalandenergydescribedbyaCobb–Douglas
function. With rising real energy prices, the composition of aggregate effective capital
becomes less energy intensive, and therefore, more capital intensive. The combined effect
isthatthepaceofintroductionofnewintermediariesslowsdownataratethatisproportional
to the rate of increase in energy prices. In order to have the model show increasing R&D
activitiesduetorisingrealenergyprices,onewouldhavetomodifythegeneralframeworkin
suchawaythatitalsoallowsforappliedR&Dthatimprovestheproductivitycharacteristics
of an intermediate ex post. In this paper, we abstained from such modiﬁcations for reasons
of simplicity. However, van Zon (2001) shows that even with such a modiﬁcation, overall
R&D efforts are likely to be negatively affected by rising real marginal costs, although the
compositionofR&DmaychangeinfavourofprocessR&DattheexpenseofbasicR&D.32
The modiﬁed model would imply lower growth in the long run. Nonetheless, our model
underestimates the total amount of R&D since it neglects the proﬁt opportunities provided
by the possibility of process R&D, or ex post productivity improvements of intermediate
goods in the context of our model. By doing so, we probably over-estimate the negative
growtheffectsofrisingrealenergyprices.ButbyusingaCobb–Douglasfunctiontodescribe
the substitution possibilities between energy and raw capital, we probably under-estimate
the negative growth effects of rising real energy prices at the same time. The reason is that
certainly in the long run substitution possibilities between raw capital and energy are likely
to be more limited than is implied by the use of a Cobb–Douglas function. This is because
there are absolute limits to the efﬁciency of energy conversion that are implied by the laws
of nature: physics ‘abhors’ an inﬁnitely high real marginal product of energy. This implies
that the asymptotic properties of a Cobb–Douglas production function (or any production
functionobeyingtheInadaconditionswithrespecttoenergy)exaggerateactualsubstitution
possibilities between capital and energy in the long run.
In addition to this, we also exaggerate the negative growth effects of rising real energy
prices,becausewehaveneglectedthepossibilityofadecreaseintheenergycontentofﬁnal
consumer demand, through a switch from material goods to immaterial services. Smulders
(1995) has hinted at the possibility that growth would become sustainable if output itself
would become more and more immaterial. But that cannot be the solution to the problem
of limiting global GHG-emissions as long as people cannot live in virtual houses and live
on virtual food. The latter are basic needs and will remain so as long as people themselves
32 In van Zon (2001), a distinction has been made between basic R&D that results in new products with cor-
respondingly new production processes, and applied R&D that results in productivity improvements ex post of
these processes. In that paper, it is shown that total R&D efforts still react positively on proﬁtability, but the mix
of basic and applied R&D depends on the relative proﬁtability of doing these types of research. Indeed, when
the costs of operating a technology increase because the factors used intensively with such technologies become
more expensive, then applied R&D activities become more important at the expense of basic R&D activities. This
results in lower growth in the long run, since that growth depends ultimately on the rate at which new products and
production processes enter the economy. The results of the present model therefore still apply in the long run, but
a more interesting and more ‘natural’ or ‘intuitive’ behaviour of the present model would result from its extension
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are material creatures that transform energy and matter. Assuming that energy will never be
created ex nihilo, this also implies that this transformation process will always lead to the
consumption of energy that needs to be produced somewhere in the system. Moreover, at
present a large part of the world population has difﬁculties in satisfying their basic needs.
Hence, the ‘immaterialisation’ of ﬁnal output is likely to be a phenomenon that is only rele-
vant in a practical sense in the very long term, when the largest part of the world population
hasgrownrichenoughtoconsiderthesatisfactionofnon-basicneedsbyimmaterialmeans.
In the mean time, the need for material inputs will no doubt continue to grow.
Although there are reasons to assume that our model does not capture all the relevant
aspects of the world to the best extent possible, the errors introduced in this way are not all
biasedinthesamedirection,whereasthegeneralconclusionregardingthereactionofR&D
performance towards the growth of real energy prices seems to be fairly robust. Hence, we
feel conﬁdent that our policy conclusions are valid in principle. The ﬁrst policy conclusion
we have arrived at is that the introduction of an energy tax in the context of the Romer
model with basic research is not enough by itself to spur R&D efforts. Rather, these are
negatively affected, because either real energy price changes or the introduction of a tax
lowers the present value of a blueprint, which in turn reduces the marginal productivity of
research labour. The second one is that the recycling of the tax proceeds in the form of
subsidies to R&D in order to mitigate the negative growth effects of continuously rising
real energy prices may indeed lead to higher growth, but only if R&D activities are not ‘too
high’ already. If the latter is the case, then the opportunity costs of doing more R&D in
terms of ﬁnal output lost are simply too high. If R&D activities are low enough then the
subsidy can indeed compensate the fall in the marginal product of labour in R&D, and in
that case, we can observe even faster growth than before the tax.
Finally, we would like to relate our paper to the recent National Energy Policy plan of
the Bush administration. The recent policy reversal of the Bush administration regarding a
more intensive use of carbon-based energy arises from the fact that continuous economic
growth necessitates a higher level of energy consumption, other things, especially tech-
nology but also private consumption, remaining the same (i.e. largely material). Given the
serious energy shortages recently experienced in the US, and given the generally higher
(and therefore politically unattractive) prices of new non-carbon-based energy technolo-
gies, there is an immediate incentive to move in the direction of a more intensive use of
carbon-basedfuels,duetotheirrelativelylowprices.However,whenrestrictionsontheuse
of carbon-based energy are lifted, it is to be expected that R&D activities on new energy
technologies will be reduced, since the availability of low priced substitutes depresses the
potential proﬁt margins on energy produced using new, less carbon intensive, technologies.
This is indeed what our model shows, and the negative impact on R&D activities indicate
that active energy and R&D policies are called for in order to secure sustainable growth in
the face of rising real energy prices.
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Appendix A. Calculating capital and energy aggregates





















































xi di = xAA
1 − α
ςα+ 1 − α
(A.4)
We can use Eq. (A.4) to solve for xA in terms of K. Then we can use Eq. (11) evaluated for
i = A to solve xe
A in terms of K, r and q. Finally, we can use Eq. (A.2) to rewrite xe
A in
terms of Ke. By equating these two expressions for xe
A, we obtain Eq. (13). Eq. (14) can be






By integrating Eq. (A.5) over i from 0 to A, we obtain Eq. (14).
Appendix B. On the constancy of the real interest rates and rising real energy prices
Growing real energy prices imply that for the same growth rate of physical capital, the
corresponding growth rate of output would be lower, ceteris paribus, which corresponds to
a fall in the real marginal product of (raw) capital (see Eq. (15)). This fall in the marginal
product of capital would provide an incentive to lower the rate of capital accumulation.33
But the ﬁrst part of Eq. (15) in combination with Eq. (13) shows that if ˆ K falls, then ˆ Y falls
too, but not by as much as the initial change in the growth rate of capital, since 0 <β<1.
This in fact raises the marginal product of capital again, providing an incentive to increase
the rate of capital accumulation again.
33 This depends on the form of the intertemporal utility function. If future consumption is indeed a substitute
for present consumption, as in the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) function that is widely
used in growth models, a fall in the marginal product of capital would raise current consumption at the expense
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In order to determine whether, and if so, how fast this adjustment process converges, one
would have to specify the ‘demand for growth’ through an intertemporal utility function,
andderivethegrowthimplicationsoftheintertemporaltrade-offbetweenpresentandfuture
consumption possibilities, and especially the adjustments in between steady states, i.e. the
transitional dynamics. That is beyond the scope of this paper, however. Nonetheless, an
intuition why and how the adjustment process outlined above would lead to a new steady
state growth equilibrium with a constant real interest rate can be developed as follows. It
should ﬁrst be noted that the aggregate effective capital stock is strictly proportional to
the physical capital stock, see Eq. (13). This implies that the marginal product of physical
capital is equal to r = ∂Y/∂K = αY/K. But then, using Eqs. (13) and (15) (without
however setting ˆ r = 0 a priori), we have
ˆ r = ˆ Y − ˆ K = α ˆ Ke − ˆ K = (1 − α + ςα) ˆ A + α (1 − β)(ˆ r −ˆ q)− (1 − α) ˆ K (B.1)
If we assume that the growth rate of physical capital would be adjusted by increasing the
previousgrowthrateofthephysicalcapitalstockbyacertainfractionψ>0o fˆ r,itfollows
that we would have
d
dt
ˆ K = ψˆ r = ψ
((1 − α + ςα) ˆ A − α(1 − β)ˆ q − (1 − α) ˆ K))
1 − α(1 − β)
(B.2)
where ˆ r has been substituted from Eq. (B.1).F o rψ>0, the solution to the differential
equation in Eq. (B.2) converges to a constant value of ˆ K. That particular constant value can
be obtained by setting Eq. (B.2) equal to zero and solving it for ˆ K. The result thus obtained
is exactly the same as in Eq. (15).
Appendix C. Ex post proﬁt erosion
The growth rate of ex post proﬁt ﬂows can be obtained as follows. Using Eqs. (17), (9)





















Eq. (C.1) shows that for an existing intermediate relative proﬁts decrease when the total
number of intermediates increases, ceteris paribus. This is the creative ‘wear and tear’
we referred to in the introduction as opposed to the complete destruction in Aghion and
Howitt (1992). Note that ex post the blueprint-index of an existing intermediate good does
not change. Therefore, using Eq. (C.1), the growth in ex post proﬁt ﬂows on an existing




· ˆ A + ˆ ΠA (C.2)
However, for constant LY and a constant real interest rate r, it follows from Eq. (17) that







· ˆ A −
α(1 − β)
(1 − α)
·ˆ q (C.3)A. van Zon, I.H. Yetkiner/Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2003) 81–103 103
Substituting Eq. (C.3) into Eq. (C.2), we ﬁnd that the (expected) growth rate of proﬁt ﬂows
on existing intermediates is equal to ˆ Πi =− (a(1 − β)/(1 − α))ˆ q.
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